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Introduction 
Political trust is a decisive element in the process of democratic governance because 
the legitimacy of representative democracy depends crucially on citizens’ political attitudes 
towards institutions and politicians.  It is true that the representation process requires some 
distance between the rulers and the ruled, but that distance cannot be too large.  If it is too 
large the representation breaks down, threatening democracy.  Put differently, it is difficult 
to accept the legitimacy of democratic power and of a political system in a context in which 
citizens do not believe in political institutions and politicians.  In discussing trust, then, we 
are discussing the existence of democracy itself.   
The studies on political trust, as well as on satisfaction with democracy and political 
support, have been frequent in political science, for example the Easton’s distinction 
between diffuse – long-run and persistent - and specific – timely-limited - support (Easton, 
1965).  More recently, the relevance is justified on the grounds that it is generally accepted 
by scholars that there is a declining trend in political trust, at least in the last two or three 
decades (Weatherford, 1984; Listhaug, 1995; Anderson, 1997).   Whether the decline in 
trust is a persistent and long-run movement that affects democratic legitimacy or a more 
time-specific wave of limited consequences it is difficult to know for now.  However, it is 
seems desirable to understand as clear as possible how the mechanism implied in trust or 
distrust works.  What are its  causes and consequences? In what contexts do citizens tend to 
trust the political system? And what happens when citizens distrust it.  In addition, it is 
highly plausible that some particular institutions make a difference in all this process.   
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The objective of this paper is to study the mechanism of citizen’s political trust in 
twelve western European governments.   The contribution of the analysis is to join two 
distinctive approaches to the study of political trust.  One approach is the explanation of 
what promotes and determines political trust or distrust.  Drawing on the recent work of 
Anderson and Guillory (1997) and Anderson and LoTempio (1999), I argue that 
citizens/voters that belong to the majority of past electoral contest have higher probability of 
trusting government actions than those that belong to the minority.  This distinction between 
what that authors call winners and losers is also important in regard to the characteristics of 
democracy, particularly in the distinction between majoritarian and consensus types of 
democracy (Lijphart, 1999).  That is, the institutional type of democracy mediates the 
attitudes of trust.  The second approach to the study of political trust is the explanation of its 
causes; roughly, the justification of its relevance.  Empirically, it is possible to see what 
difference it makes to trust or not in government.  In this part, I draw on the recent work of 
Hetherington (1998; 1999); in particular, I argue that whether or not one trusts in 
government makes a difference in future voting behavior.  The existence of the two 
approaches suggests the recognition that political trust is not only a uni-causal mechanism of 
political systems.  Bringing them together, as I do here, is, therefore, a necessary step in 
improving the knowledge on the mechanisms of political trust.  The paper is organized as 
follows.  In the first two sections, I explain the theoretical arguments that justify the 
empirical model, basically the explanation of the mechanisms of political trust functioning.  
Next, I explain the research design employed to test empirically this issue.  Then, I present 
the results of the recursive causal model and discuss the results.   
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 Democracy and Political Trust 
In a normative and valorous sense, democracy and the process of representation are 
achieved through a relationship between the citizens and the State that has to work 
adequately, in a way that guarantees that the necessary distance is not dangerously large.  
That relationship largely resembles an exchange process, in which political institutions and 
politicians need to be responsive to the demands of the citizens, which, in turn, have to 
control that responsiveness by giving their supporting (Fuchs and Klingmann, 1995).  This 
implies that a democratic government receives the votes of citizens, apply the preferred 
public policy, and is trusted as well as it obtains political support.  Here two points are 
needed.  The first is that if the link of trust and support fails, the process states that support 
is channeled to the opposition.  The second point is that this process works this way because 
public resources are limited and because the implementation of a policy rules out the others 
and its supporters (idem).  (This second element is very important and explains the relevance 
of the distinction between winners and losers, to which I return in the next section.)  Of 
course, this is an ideal picture and a somewhat simplistic and mechanical explanation.  
However, it surely has links to reality.  At least, it provides a feasible framework to 
understand the process.  In addition, because it is simple, the explanation can be turned into 
an empirical hypothesis that can be tested.   
In this explanation, political trust plays a pivotal role; therefore, it must be clarified.  
To guarantee that the democratic process works, citizens have to believe in the political 
system and politicians, as well as in the incumbent government.  This distinction is very 
similar to Easton’s notions of diffuse and specific support (Easton 1965).  The first 
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corresponds to a long-standing persistent predisposition associated more with the political 
system as a whole, and the second means the evaluations of the outputs of the system, 
therefore, more related with the actual government.  While this is a very important 
classification, it is not exhaustive of the possible attitudes of citizens toward democratic 
institutions (Weatherford, 1984).  More importantly, it is not easy to distinguish empirically 
between the two indicators because they are highly correlated (Anderson and Guillory, 
1997: 70)1.  In this sense, I ignore the distinction, and I will define political trust as people’s 
beliefs or “feelings about the government” (Anderson and LoTempio, 1999: 1).  Usually, 
these evaluative feelings include different dimensions, such as honesty and ethical qualities, 
ability and efficacy of government, and correctness of their policy orientations 
(Hetherington, 1998).  In sum, the pivotal role of political trust is explained because how 
voters behave and how they experience the functioning of political system has consequences 
on whether or not they trust the government, and if they trust behave differently.   
Winning and Losing in Democracy 
At this point, another element needs to be added to the argument.  Democracy cannot 
be fully analyzed through an analysis of its normative and valorous implications.  
Democracy is also a pragmatic reality.  In that sense, it is about determining ‘who rules?’, 
that is, which policies will and will not be implemented.  Differently, democracy implies the 
existence of winners and losers (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Anderson and LoTempio, 
                                                 
1 For a discussion regarding the long-run persistency (diffuse) versus cyclical (specific) character of 
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1999).  Losing is important because political scarcity determines economic and political 
losses (Riker, 1982), either individually or collectively.  Therefore, in democracy, being a 
winner or loser is a key difference. 
If winning and losing matters, it appears reasonable and intuitive to expect that losers 
and winners have different attitudes toward democratic institutions in general, for example 
government.  Winners tend to evaluate the actions of government more positively; therefore, 
they tend to support it and trust in it.  For example, Anderson and Guillory (1997), in a study 
on western European democracies, found that “the losers of democratic competition show 
lower levels of satisfaction than do those in the majority” (Anderson and Guillory, 1997: 
66).  In a different study, on the American Presidency and Congress, the authors have also 
found that being winner or loser is a strong predictor of political trust.  In particular, the 
winners are more likely to trust the President and Congress (Anderson and LoTempio, 
1999).  From these arguments, I derive my first hypothesis to be empirically tested.   
Hypothesis 1: Winners of the last electoral contest are more likely to have 
political trust. 
But the argument regarding the attitudes of winners and losers can be made subtler if 
the role of institutions is taken into account.  “Institutions are the rules of the game” and the 
“constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 1).  This means that institutions 
mediate the relation between winner/loser status and political trust. Winners and losers have 
incentives to show different attitudes in different institutional contexts, for example, in 
different types of democracy.  The ‘conceptual map’ that results from the works of Lijphart 
                                                                                                                                                      
political support see the controversy in Miller 1974 and Citrin, 1974.  See also Weatherford, 1984.    
(1999) implies that majoritarian and consensual democracies2 differ in important aspects, in 
particular, with regard to the question of ‘who rules?’.  In the majoritarian model of 
democracy, the answer is that the majority of people rules almost unchallenged.  In the 
consensual model, the answer is that as many people as possible should rule (Lijphart, 1999: 
2).  From these two different answers, it is implied that majoritarian types of democracy 
tend to promote a more rigid  and marked split between the majority and the minority, that 
is, between winners and losers.  The argument is that one should expect a greater split 
between winners and losers when a democracy is a majoriatarian-type, and vice-versa with 
losers.  Therefore, two more hypotheses appear to be in order regarding the attitudes of 
winners and losers.   
Hypothesis 2a: In consensual types of democracy, losers are more likely to have 
political trust than in majoritarian systems.  
Hypothesis 2b: In consensual types of democracy, winners are less likely to have 
political trust than in majoritarian systems. 
Political Trust and Future Voting Behavior 
The exchange process of responsiveness and control between government and 
citizens implies that the effect of past vote in political trust, which is basically a mechanism 
that has to do with voters and their attitudes facing the institutional context.  The game is 
repeated and has another dimension that brings the government to be part of it through the 
                                                 
2 The conceptual map is not defined in dual terms of a democracy being either majoritarian or consensual.  
Because there is almost no pure cases, the democracies can be classified in an index.   
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existence of political oppositions.  Democracy and representation implies that if government 
fails to be responsive, the support is canalized to opposition.  There is, therefore, a 
simultaneous relationship, as is pointed out by Hetherington (1998).  Political trust is 
relevant because it has also strong implications, it is not only a indicator of quality of 
democracy.  If there is no trust in government or it is low, “then incumbent approval will 
also be lower” (Hetherington, 1998: 791).    
In addition, there are also other plausible reasons to expect an effect of political trust 
on vote intention. One argument made by Hetherington (1999) is that with the decline of 
partisanship and retrospective evaluations, trust appears to be “a particularly powerful 
heuristic.” (Hetherington, 1999: 311). Thus, for these reasons I expect that political trust 
affects vote intentions of citizens.   
Hypothesis 3: Voters who trust the government are more likely to vote for the 
incumbent. 
At this point, the role of institutions is again important.  For example, Hetherington 
has presented the role of third parties in mediating the effects of political trust on the vote 
for incumbent.  Again, I argue on behalf of the importance of the type of democracy. The 
reasons are similar to those presented to explain their role in mediating the attitudes of 
winners and losers.  In this case, institutions mediate the role of trusting the government.  
Because in majoritarian systems the split is larger, I expect the influence of trust in 
government be stronger than in consensual types.  Therefore the last two hypotheses are 
intuitive.     
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Hypothesis 4a: In consensual types of democracy, those who trust the government 
are more likely to vote for the incumbent than in majoritarian systems.  
Hypothesis 4b: In consensual types of democracy, those who do not trust the 
government are less likely to vote for the incumbent than in majoritarian systems. 
Research Design 
The purpose of this study is to advance some explanations of the dynamics of 
political trust mechanisms.  The theoretical arguments of the last sections drive us to four 
main hypotheses that can be tested empirically.  The tests I made here concern the analysis 
of political trust toward government and parliaments (which usually support the government 
or the government coalitions).   
The design of research constitutes a cross-national study of twelve west European 
democracies.  The design strongly depends on the nature of the available data of the 
Eurobarometer 1994 surveys.  Questions about political attitudes, political behavior, and 
political participation, and social-economic conditions are individual data of European 
voters.  The variables about the type of democracy are defined country-by-country.  This 
kind of join information allows the integration country political context, or, the integration 
of the role of institutions in the model as mediators of the dynamics of political trust.  As 
Anderson and Guillory (1997) point out, “much of the research on the determinants of 
system support in Western democracies is notably institution-free because it has focused on 
the study of attitudes using variables measured exclusively at the level of individuals” 
(Anderson and Guillory, 1997: 69).  Institutions shape human behavior, thus, integrating 
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them into the analysis the explanations turn to be stronger than in the case of individual 
attitudes only.   
The Causal Model 
Taken together, the arguments and the hypotheses can be put in a simple causal 











The Variables  
Political Trust in Government and in Parliament 
As results from the theoretical explanation, political trust is a nuclear concept in the 
model.   It is assumed to be effect and cause in the model of public attitudes and behavior.  I 
is expected to be higher among those who vote for the government or the government 
coalition in the past elections (winners) and is to be even higher in majoritarian types of 
democracy.  The opposite is expected to happen with losers.  In addition, which is the 
second part of the causal model, political trust is also a determinant of vote intentions.  
Political trust is assumed here as straightforward concept as is defined before.  Roughly, it is 
taken as public sentiment or believes about the government or parliament.  
As results from the data available, the Eurobarometer surveys, it is measured in 
dichotomous terms.   Citizens are asked whether they trust or not in the government and 
whether they relay/trust on parliament (see Appendix A for the specific question wording).  
It is coded 1 if citizens trust on government or on parliament and coded 0 otherwise.   
Vote Intentions 
Vote intentions is also a key variables of the model.  It is, I think, a fairly good 
indicator of voting behavior in elections.  As elections are the most important single element 
of democracy, therefore, the importance of vote intentions in the model is explained per se.  
It permits to understand the implications of trusting government and the implications of past 
vote, as well as the role of the type of democracy.  It is also a dichotomous variable that is 
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coded 1 when the voters intended to vote on government party or one of the parties of the 
government coalition.  It is coded as 0 otherwise.   
Winner and Losers - Past Vote 
The third key variable of the model is past vote, which determines the status of 
winner or loser in the political arena.  As the question of who rules and who is ruled out of 
policy-making is so central to democracy, it is expected to have influence on the levels of 
political trust and vote intentions.  Its effect is also expected to be mediated by the type of 
democracy of the country.  It is again a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 in 
case of the respondent be a winner – vote for government in the last elections - and takes the 
value of 0 in the case of respondent to be a loser.  
Index of Majoritarian versus Consensual Democracy  
The importance of the type of democracy is that it is assumed to mediate the 
behaviors and attitudes of citizens.  The difference between the attitudes of winners and 
losers is expected to be stronger in majoritarian, because these political systems are rooted 
in a higher split between majority and minority.  With political trust the mediative effect is 
assumed in a similar fashion.   
The variable is measured here through the index of consensus and majoritarian 
democracy developed by Lijphart (1999) and reported in Anderson and Guillory (1997: 68).  
The values of the index centered around zero and the higher the values of the index the more 
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the country has a consensual type of democracy.   Because I am testing only the mediative 
effect of this variable, it enters the statistical analysis only in multiplicative terms.       
Economic and Life Evaluations 
Political trust and vote intentions can also suffer from the influence of economic 
conditions.  Economy is clearly one of the most important elements of the output of political 
system, therefore, its influence in trust and voting seems to be very straightforward (Clarke, 
Dutt, Kornberg, 1993; Fiorina, 1995). 
To measure economic conditions I include a variable that refers to the citizen’s 
assessment of economic situation in the 12 months before the survey.  It is a scale that 
ranges from 1 (a worse economic situation) to 5 (a lot better situation). 
Another variable included is assessment of life situation.  The line of reasoning is 
similar to economic evaluation, in this case with emphasis on overall condition of the 
society.  It is treated in dichotomous terms, in which 1 is coded as satisfied with life and 
coded as 0 otherwise.       
Satisfaction with the Democracy 
I also include a variable that measures satisfaction with democracy, as I expect that 
attitudes of citizens can be different.  Satisfaction with democracy in general leads to more 
positive assessments of political system.  It is also included in the model to distinguish from 
the effects of political trust.  Here is measured in dichotomous terms, with 1 one coding as 
satisfaction and 0 as dissatisfaction. 
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Political Interest 
Political interest is another political-like variable that is reasonable to assume to have 
effects on political trust and vote intentions.  As with satisfaction with democracy, those 
who are interested in politics tend to have more positive assessments of political system, 
therefore, behaving differently.  Is measured here in scale that ranges from 1 (no interest at 
all) to 4 (a great deal of interest.  
Demographic Characteristics 
Lastly, I include three sociodemographic control variables that are the usually 
included in models about attitudes and  behavior: age, sex, and years or education.  
The Data 
The data for this study comes from the Eurobarometer surveys of 1994. Here I use 
data of individuals surveyed in twelve west European countries are included.  The questions 
that result in the variables used here are presented in Appendix A3.    
The Recursive Causal Model 
From the preceding explanations of the theoretical model, the statistical regression 
model that results is the following recursive causal model, with two equations to be 
estimated.  The first to explain political trust, mainly as affected by winner or loser status 
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and type of democracy mediative effect.  The second is to explain the consequences of 
political trust on vote intentions, again, with the effect of institutions.  Giving the structure 
of both variables on the left-hand side of the equations, I estimate the equations with a 
logistic model.     
 
Equation 1 
Log (Odds PoliticalTrust)) = β0 + β1 WinnerLoser + β2 TypeDemocracy * WinnerLoser +   
β3 Democracy Satisfaction + β4 PoliticalInterest + β5 EconomicSituation + 
β6 LifeSituation + β7 Age + β8 Sex + β9 YearEducation + ε 
 
Equation 2  
Log (Odds VoteGovernment) = β0 + β1 PoliticalTrust  +  β2 TypeDemocracy * PoliticalTrust 
β3 WinnerLoser + β4 TypeDemocracy * WinnerLoser + β5 Democracy 
Satisfaction + β6 PoliticalInterest + β7 EconomicSituation + β8 
LifeSituation + β9 Age + β10 Sex + β11 YearEducation + ε 
 
The Dynamics of Trust in Government 
Do political trust works as predicted in theoretical arguments? I believe the answer is 
that the empirical test provides support for one main argument of the theory and do not 
support the other.  
                                                                                                                                                      
3 The Eurobarometer data is available in the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research.   
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[Insert Table – B1 about here] 
Equations 1 and 2 of the recursive model are estimated to analyze political trust in 
national government (and also to analyze political trust is national parliament. The next 
section deals with parliament results, the last two columns of the table).  In general, the 
results of the regressions are generally statistically significant at the conventional levels, at 
least with respect to the key variables of the model – winner/loser and political trust.   
The relevance of being a winner or a loser in the political system is clearly 
supported. Winners reveal higher probabilities of trust national government.  In addition, 
that status is also an even more important predictor of vote intentions.  That is, past vote 
determines vote intentions.   
The key role of political trust in the theory I presented is also clearly supported.  The 
second equation shows that those who trust the government are more likely to have 
intentions to vote in government or in a party of the government coalition.  The effect of 
political trust does not disappear with the inclusion of other variables that were expected to 
strongly affect vote intentions.  This means that, first, winners and losers have different 
probabilities of trust government and, second and more important, that political trust is a 
relevant concept in political science.   
However, the results do not provide the support for the mediative of the type 
democracy.   The hypothesized relationship is that a majoritarian or consensual type of 
democracy would make a difference in the attitude within winners and losers.  That is, 
winners are hypothesized to be even more likely to trust the government in the case of 
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majoritarian systems.  On the contrary, losers are expected even more likely to trust in the 
case of consensual systems.  Given that the Lijphart index is constructed in a way that 
higher values correspond to more consensual systems, the sign of the multiplicative is 
expected to be negative in first and second equations.   
Surprisingly, I should confess, that result is not what happens here.  I have no 
particular explanations for that, because this result contradicts the results of Anderson and 
Guillory (1997), who supported that kind of hypothesis in the case of satisfaction with 
democracy in west European countries.  However, these author test that mediative 
hypothesis with a slightly different statistical procedure.  Rather than use multiplicative 
terms as I do here, they split the entire sample in two, one for winners and other for losers.  
Then, they test the additive effect of Lijphart index and compare the results between the 
samples.  That way, they find negative sign in winners regression and positive in the losers 
regression, which confirms the hypothesis.  In face of my surprising results, I replicate their 
analysis to see whether the difference lies on a simple statistical or sampling problem that I 
cannot figure out.  Therefore I run two different regression, one for winners and other for 
losers, but the results do not change in ways to make acceptable to support the hypothesis.   
[Insert Table – B2 about here] 
Trust in European Parliaments 
In table B1 there is also results about trust in national parliaments.  The results are 
not very different from those verified with respect to governments.  This result is not 
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surprising at all, if one remember that in west European democracies governments are 
supported and maintained in parliaments (for example, Portugal).  In some of the cases, the 
elections exist to elect parliament, which, then, approves the government.  Therefore, it is 
not surprising that past vote, vote intentions, and political trust, either in government or 
parliament, move in the same direction.  In sum, the statistical results in the case of 
parliament largely allow the same kind of conclusions advanced to explain political trust in 
government.  
Conclusion 
The contribution of this study is to integrate two different and recent models of 
analysis of political trust in a single model of explanation, in this case a recursive causal 
model.  On one hand, The works of Anderson and Guillory (1997) and Anderson and 
LoTempio (1999) provide the explanations of how winners and losers of past electoral 
contest tend to show different levels of political trust, as well as why the type of democracy 
(consensual or majoritarian) mediates that link.  On the other hand, the work of 
Hetherington (1998; 1999) calls our attention for the direct question of why political is 
important in politics, for example to understand its effect on feelings and vote on president.  
Both analysis are presented here at one time, in a way that gives entire support to both 
researches, but also show that each one deals with just one part of the issue.  Political trust is 
not only determined but also determines attitudes and behaviors.    
The study is just a little step of advance in relation of both the cited approaches 
referred, but, I think, the integration of both argument in a simple explanation needs to be 
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done.  It is true that the mediative effect of type of democracy was not supported here.  That 
result does not mean at all that the variable does not have effect.  I am strongly convinced it 
does.   This means that more research should be done in this direction.  One immediate 
suggestion is to work with a more sophisticated statistical model, for example nonrecursive 
causal model.  This study was just the first step, a step that interpreted as that can surely be a 
valid improvement.   
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Appendix A  
The data for this study is provided by the 1994 Eurobarometer.  The question 
wording is the following. 
 
RELAY ON THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT                                     
Q.77b  <Decisions taken by the (NATIONALITY) government 1. Can rely on it; 
2.  Cannot rely on it                                                       
     
RELAY ON THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT                                     
Q.77d  <Decisions taken by ...THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT: USE PROPER NAME FOR 
LOWER HOUSE i.e.                   
"ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE" (FRANCE), BUNDESTAG (GERMANY),                            
HOUSE OF COMMONS (UNITED KINGDOM), ... 1. Can rely on it; 2.  Cannot rely 
on it.                                                       
    
VOTE INTENTION                                                         
D.4  If there were a "General Election" tomorrow (SAY IF                        
CONTACT UNDER 18 YEARS: and you had a vote), which party                        
would you vote for?                                                             
 
VOTING BEHAVIOUR LAST NAT ELECTION                                     
D.5  Which party did you vote for at the last "General                          
Election" of (YEAR OF ELECTION IN RESPECTIVE COUNTRY)?                          
 
LIFE SATISFACTION                                                      
Q.2  On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied,                    
not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you                    
lead? Would you say you are ...? 1 Very satisfied; 2. Fairly satisfied; 3.  
Not very satisfied; 4. Not at all satisfied.                                            
  
ECONOMIC SITUATION - LAST 12 MONTHS                                   
Q.5  Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that ... 
Q.5a  The general economic situation in this country <now is> 1. A lot 
better; 2. A little better; 3. Stayed the same; 4. A little worse; 5. A 
lot of worse.                                                          
 
POLITICAL INTEREST                                                    
Q.19  To what extent would you say you are interested in                        
politics? 1. A great deal; 2. To some extent; 3. Not much; 4. Not at all.               
 
DEMOCRACY SATISFACTION - COUNTRY                                     
Q.21a  On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied,                  
not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way                         
democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)? 1. Very satisfied; 2. Fairly satisfied; 
3. Not very satisfied; 3. Not at all satisfied.  
 
AGE EDUCATION - RECODED                                                
D.8R  <Age when respondent stopped full-time education -                        
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collapsed categories> 1. Up to 14 years; 2. 15 years; 3. 16 years; 4. 17 
years; 5. 18 years; 6. 19 years; 7. 20 years; 8. 21 years; 9. 22 years and 
older; 10. Still studying                                                         
 
SEX - D.10  SEX   1.  Male; 2.  Female                                                  
 
AGE EXACT - D.11  How old are you?  (YEARS OF AGE)                                      
 
SOCIAL CLASS SUBJECTIVE                                               
D.23  If you were asked to choose one of these five names for                   
your social class, which would you say you belong to? 1.  Middle class; 2.  
Lower middle class; 3.  Working class; 4.  Upper class; 5.  Upper middle 
class; 6.  Refuses to be classified; 7.  Other                                          
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Appendix B 
Table B1 - Logistic Regression Results 
 Government  Parliament  
Variables Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
EQUATION 1 –  Political Trust    
Winner/Loser .5925 .1519 .4084 .0505
Winner/Loser *Type of Democracy .1199 .0492 .1120 .0480
Democracy Satisfaction 1.2855 .0517 1.1443 .0499
Political Interest .0239 .0282 .0622 .0272
Economic Situation .3038 .0261 .2546 .0250
Life Situation .1908 .0668 .1896 .0633
Age .0074 .0016 .0069 .0016
Sex - .0283 .0499 - .0056 .0481
Year Education .0077 .0090 .0311 .0087
Constant - 2.1971 .1363 - 1.9555 .1250
-2LL  10293.064  10352.403 
EQUATION 2 – Vote Intent. Govern.    
Political Trust (Gov / Parlaiment) .7988 .0862 .6192 .0861
Trust * Type of Democracy .1767 .0725 .1947 .0719
Winner/Loser 4.3622 .0841 4.362 .0841
Winner/Loser *Type of Democracy .6291 .0793 .6152 .0754
Democracy Satisfaction .4781 .0903 .5506 .0898
Political Interest - .1244 .0457 - .1217 .0458
Economic Situation .1330 .0423 .1738 .0423
Life Situation .0140 .1098 .0540 .1098
Age - .0016 .0026 - .0012 .0026
Sex - .1289 .0799 - .1138 .0800
Year Education .0427 .0149 .0356 .0148
Constant - 3.4698 .2090 - 3.5766 .2100




Table B2 – Logistic Regression Results Winners and Losers Separate Samples 
 WINNERS  LOSERS 
Variables Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
EQUATION 1 –  Political Trust    
Type of Democracy .1457 .0486 .2526 .0372
Democracy Satisfaction 1.1196 .0842 1.3572 .0636
Political Interest .1592 .0466 - .0478 .0347
Economic Situation .3357 .0420 .2912 .0323
Life Situation - .0178 .1102 .2850 .0817
Age .0088 .0025 .0063 .0020
Sex .0622 .0795 - .0876 .0621
Year Education - .0041 .0149 - .0010 .0113
Constant - 1.8215 .2100 -1.9820 
-2LL  3858.168  6231.755 
EQUATION 2 – Vote Intent. Govern.    
Political Trust in Government .8118 .1158 .6373 .1309
Type of Democracy .8104 .0667 .4926 .0803
Democracy Satisfaction .5715 .1217 .3545 .1360
Political Interest -.0302 .0652 - 1969 .0671
Economic Situation .2084 .0579 .0398 .0637
Life Situation .0866 .1443 - .1196 .1686
Age .0090 .0036 - .0142 .0042
Sex - .2391 .1122 - .0204 .1172
Year Education - .0540 .0209 .1059 .0217
Constant .3217 .1158  







Variable N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Trust in Government 11325 0 1 .54 .50 
Trust in Parliament  11107 0 1 .57 .50 
Vote Intention Government 10035 0 1 .38 .48 
Winner/Loser 10306 0 1 .40 .49 
Lijphart Index 12563 - 156 1.08 2.396E-02 .8116 
Political Interest 14002 1 4 2.36 .92 
Democracy Satisfaction 14700 0 1 .57 .49 
Economic Situation 13742 1 5 2.89 1.00 
Life Situation 13999 0 1 .82 .39 
Sex 16677 0 1 .50 .50 
Age 16675 13 98 43.42 17.78 




Anderson, Christopher J. and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. “Political Institutions and 
Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and 
Majoritarian Systems.” American Political Science Review 91: 66-81. 
Anderson, Christopher J. and Andrew LoTempio. 1999. “Winning, Losing, and Political 
Trust.” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association.  
Citrin, Jack. 1974. “Comment: The political relevance of Trust in Government” American 
Political Science Review 68: 973-988. 
Citrin, Jack and Donald Green. 1986. “Presidential leadership and the resurgence of Trust in 
Government”. British Journal of Political Science 16: 431-453. 
Clarke, Harold, Nitish Dutt, and Allan Kornberg. 1993. “The Political Economy of Attitudes 
Toward Polity and society in Western European Democracies. “ The Journal of 
Politics 55: 998-1021.   
Easton, David. 1965. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall  
Fiorina, Morris P. 1997. “Voting Behavior.” in Dennis Mueller, ed. Perspectives on Public 
Choice: A Handbook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp 391-414. 
Fuchs, Dieter and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1995. “Citizens and the State: A Changing 
Relationship.” in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds. Citizens and 
the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-23. 
Hetherington, Marc J. 1998. “The Political Relevance of Political Trust.” American Political 
Science Review 92: 791-808. 
Hetherington, Marc J. 1999. “The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 1968-
96.” American Political Science Review 93: 311-326.  
 24
Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and performance in 
Thirty-Six Countries.  New Have: Yale University Press.    
Listhaug, Ola. 1995. ”The Dynamics of Trust in Politicians” in Hans-Dieter Klingemann 
and Dieter Fuchs, eds. Citizens and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
pp. 261-297. 
Miller, Arthur H. 1974. “Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970.” American 
Political Science Review 68: 9511-972. 
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Riker, William H.  1982. Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the 
Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Prospect Heights: 
Waveland Press. 
Weatherford, M. Stephen. 1984. “Economic ‘Stagflation’ and Public support for the 
Political System.” British Journal of Political Science 14: 187-205.  
 25
